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The Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence August 2016
On the Duty to Reconstruct After War: 
Who is responsible for jus post bellum?
Lonneke Peperkamp
War can easily be classified as the most destructive of all human activity. After 
the smoke clears, one side of the coin might be a picture of parades and smil-
ing faces. However, the other side of the coin is likely to be a picture of dam-
age, destruction and deprivation. How should we deal with those post war situa-
tions? This question has come to the forefront of academic and political debates 
the last decade.1 Many argue that the problems encountered in and after today’s 
armed conflicts, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, demonstrate the need for 
norms to govern the aftermath of war.2 Therefore, jus post bellum is welcomed 
as a ‘new’ branch of just war theory, complementing the theory’s two traditional 
branches—jus ad bellum and jus in bello.3 Jus post bellum is meant to function as 
moral compass, offering the needed guidance in the aftermath of war. Its norms 
regulate the transition from war back to a ‘normal’ state of peace. As such, it 
aims to provide a framework guiding political and military action, and it forms a 
standard which can be used to evaluate and judge particular post war situations. 
A just and stable peace is the axiomatic goal of jus post bellum.4 
 While many agree on the importance of a third branch, the debate large-
ly revolves around its exact content. What falls under the heading of jus post 
I would like to thank Thomas Mertens, Ronald Tinnevelt and a CJLJ reviewer for their helpful 
comments and suggestions.
 1. While Schuck was the first to explicitly address jus post bellum in 1994, attention grew par-
ticularly in the last ten years. See, e.g., Michael J Schuck, “When the Shooting Stops: Missing 
Elements in Just War Theory” (1994) 111:30 Christian Century 983; Louis V Iasiello, “Jus Post 
Bellum: The moral responsibilities of victors in war” (2004) 57:3-4 Naval War College Review 
33; Richard DiMeglio, “The Evolution of the Just War Tradition: Defining Jus Post Bellum” 
(2005) 186 Mil L Rev 116; Brian Orend, “Jus Post Bellum: A Just War Theory Perspective” 
in Carsten Stahn & Jann Kleffner, eds, Jus Post Bellum, Towards a Law of Transition From 
Conflict to Peace (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2008) at 31.
 2. See, e.g., Iasiello, supra note 1 at 39; Alex Bellamy, “The responsibilities of victory: Jus Post 
Bellum and the Just War” (2008) 34:4 Review of International Studies 601 at 601; Orend, 
supra note 1 at 36.
 3. Not everyone however welcomes jus post bellum. There are few authors who criticize this 
new branch of just war theory. Alex Bellamy, e.g., argues that we should be careful to insist 
that jus post bellum has become a third branch of just war theory, since its incorporation is by 
no means unproblematic. “As yet unresolved questions about its connection to the other just 
war criteria, their applicability in different types of war, their impact upon broader judgments 
about legitimacy, and relationship with the indeterminacy of the jus ad bellum criteria, suggest 
that it is premature to insist that jus post bellum has become a third component of the Just War 
tradition.” Bellamy, supra note 2 at 622. Seth Lazar is also skeptical and argues that we do 
not need jus post bellum as part of just war theory, because the issues it regulates are better 
perceived in the broader ethics of peace building. Jus post bellum needs to look forward to the 
task of peace building and is therefore grounded in a broader ethics of peace building instead 
of flowing from just war theory. See Seth Lazar, “Endings and Aftermath in the Ethics of War” 
(2010) 13 CSSJ Working Paper, online: http://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/materials/centres/social-
justice/working-papers/SJ016_Lazar_Endings&Aftermath_War.pdf.
 4. E.g., Mark Evans, “Moral Responsibilities and the Conflicting Demands of Jus Post Bellum” 
(2009) 23:2 Ethics & International Affairs 147 at 149.
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bellum? Some post bellum norms are found in practically all proposals. This 
can be called the ‘core’ of jus post bellum. The first priority after war is halting 
the aggression and ensuring safety and security in the war-affected area. This 
means both guaranteeing international peace and security, through the preven-
tion of future external aggression, and guaranteeing the security of the citizens 
of the defeated state itself, which means the prevention of future internal ag-
gression. Reconstruction of the defeated state is also an undisputed part of jus 
post bellum. Political reconstruction entails for example (but not necessarily) 
institutional reform, legislative reform, reformation of the security sector, the 
realization of human rights, and replacement of (members of) the prior regime. 
General reconstruction entails broader tasks as economic development,5 re-
building infrastructure like road, rails and electrical grids,6 and cleaning up the 
environment. Criminal justice is also widely acknowledged as part of the core 
of jus post bellum. It deals with international crimes that were committed before 
and/or during the war.7  
 The exact tasks and scope of norms proposed under the heading of jus post 
bellum varies and has changed in the course of its relatively short existence. In 
traditional just war theory, the conception of (what is now called) jus post bel-
lum was limited. This ‘minimalist’ jus post bellum was premised upon the idea 
that just wars are conservative in character.8 The restoration of the situation 
quo ante bellum is the just outcome of war.9 As such, norms of such just post 
bellum are primarily backward looking, focused on the former belligerents, 
particularly limiting what victors are allowed to do after war. Consequently, the 
tasks of minimalist jus post bellum are restricted to a restoration of the previous 
situation, the resistance and prevention of aggression, extracting reparations 
and pursuing criminal justice. This conception of jus post bellum has changed 
and today, there is a general tendency towards a ‘maximalist’ conception of jus 
post bellum.10 This means that the body of jus post bellum has grown; more 
tasks are taken up under this heading. Reconstruction is considered to be an 
essential part of contemporary jus post bellum. It not only entails political re-
construction, but various tasks regarding general and economic reconstruction 
as well. As a result, the scope of jus post bellum, especially reconstruction, can 
be quite comprehensive, post bellum tasks require a fairly long timeframe, and 
involve a broad set of positive duties. Norms of maximalist jus post bellum are 
 5. Mark Evans, “‘Just Peace’ An Elusive Ideal” in Eric Patterson, ed, Ethics Beyond War’s End 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012) 197 at 208; Mark Allman & Tobias 
Winright, After the Smoke Clears: The Just War Tradition and Post War Justice (Maryknoll: 
Orbis Books, 2010) at 160-63.
 6. Evans, supra note 5 at 207-08; Allman & Winright, supra note 5 at 161; Brian Orend, “Justice 
after War” (2002) 16:1 Ethics & International Affairs 43 at 52.
 7. Other tasks of jus post bellum that are often mentioned are compensation, reparations and 
reconciliation. 
 8. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 3rd ed 
(New York: Basic Books, 2000) at 121.
 9. Michael Walzer, “The Aftermath of War. Reflections on Jus Post Bellum” in Eric Patterson, ed, 
Ethics Beyond War’s End (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012) 35 at 36. 
 10. See further: Lonneke Peperkamp, “Jus Post Bellum: A Case of Minimalism versus 
Maximalism?” (2014) 21:3 Ethical Perspectives 255.
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.18
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Radboud University Nijmegen, on 04 Feb 2020 at 20:38:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
On the Duty to Reconstruct After War 405
therefore no longer mainly backward, but also forward looking: not aimed at 
restoring the previous situation, but rather aimed at improving the situation of 
deprivation in the defeated state. As a result, it is not exclusively addressed to 
the former belligerents. 
 This short assessment leads to an important question which has not received 
sufficient attention in the jus post bellum literature: After war, how should we 
distribute post war duties and how can we assign them to the appropriate actors? 
In other words, who are the addressees of jus post bellum—the duty bearers? 
The development regarding jus post bellum’s content and scope brings to light a 
very serious problem: it is far from clear who is responsible for realizing jus post 
bellum. This uncertainty about specific duty bearers might lead to a situation in 
which no one will properly acquit these duties, and the critique could be raised 
that jus post bellum is in fact merely empty rhetoric.11 If responsibility for the 
duty to reconstruct cannot be assigned, does this third branch of just war theory 
exist? For the theory to be action guiding and effective, it is crucial that it is pos-
sible to determine who is responsible after war. It appears that this question is 
not to be answered easily. While it is clear that the (would be) belligerents are the 
addressees of jus ad bellum and jus in bello norms, this seems different for the 
third branch of just war theory. The general shift towards maximalist jus post bel-
lum means that this branch entails positive duties, is both backward and forward 
looking, and that post war reconstruction is of the essence for building a just and 
stable peace. In light of the interest of all states in a lasting peace, it might be 
inappropriate to address only former belligerents for jus post bellum based on the 
fact that they were engaged in this war. Rather, it seems that the contemporary 
maximalist view on jus post bellum entails that the international community as 
a whole is responsible for post war reconstruction. But in that case, how do we 
determine more precisely who the specific duty bearers are?
 In the contemporary debate on jus post bellum, responsibility is assigned to 
different actors, based on different moral or prudential arguments. Two main 
positions can be distinguished. The first position holds that post bellum duties 
should be assigned to the states that took part in the war: the former belligerents. 
Michael Walzer is an important representative of what James Pattison calls the 
‘belligerents rebuild thesis;’12 Walzer holds that the just victor is primarily re-
sponsible for jus post bellum. Analogue to individuals who do good in the world 
and as result have more obligations than people who do nothing, states who do 
the right thing also acquire more responsibilities, so Walzer argues.13 The jus ad 
bellum decision entails positive post war duties that need to be fulfilled. On top 
of that, unilateral action of the victors is most effective in this respect, particu-
larly if regulated by an international organization.14 Brian Orend agrees that post 
 11. See also: James Pattison, “Jus Post Bellum and the Responsibility to Rebuild” (2015) 45:3 
British Journal of Political Science 635 at 636; Alexandra Gheciu & Jennifer Welsh, “The 
Imperative to Rebuild: Assessing the Normative Case for Postconflict Reconstruction” (2009) 
23:2 Ethics & International Affairs 121 at 137.
 12. Pattison, supra note 11 at 636.
 13. Walzer, supra note 9 at 40.
 14. Ibid at 41. 
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bellum duties are implied in the cause for war and puts forward another impor-
tant argument for this position: the just victor is responsible based on the ‘Pottery 
Barn Rule:’ ‘you break it, you own it.’15 Walzer urges that we are sensitive to 
the needs and sentiments of the local population, which means that we have to 
involve the population of the defeated state to gain legitimacy.16 
 Among others, Pattison rejects the ‘belligerents rebuild thesis’, because as-
signing post bellum duties to belligerents leads to unfair and imprudent out-
comes, e.g., that humanitarian interveners should rebuild; that belligerents are 
often not the most appropriate actors to fulfill these tasks; that belligerents can 
cease to exist; that it might be difficult to distribute duties between belligerents; 
and that they can refuse to fulfill them.17 The concern that belligerents might not 
be the most appropriate actors to reconstruct the war torn state is voiced more of-
ten. This can be the result of a lack of political will or a lack of material capacity 
of belligerents.18 Seth Lazar argues that in general, assigning post bellum duties 
(solely) to the just victor would place a too heavy burden on them.19 Therefore, 
these theorists defend the second position, namely that the international commu-
nity as a whole is responsible. One might call this the ‘universal rebuild thesis,’ 
since it is argued here that post bellum duties are universal.20 This position would 
then reflect contemporary international practice, in which states are considered 
to hold a shared responsibility for human security. E.g., part of the ‘responsibility 
to protect’, now widely endorsed, is the ‘responsibly to rebuild’ after war.21 It is 
argued that “peacemaking has become an international affair.”22 
 It is clear that there is disagreement in the current debate and that the two 
main positions resemble a more limited and a more extensive understanding of 
jus post bellum. Different and often competing arguments are used as founda-
tion for post war responsibility, often without an elaborate explanation. For the 
first position, assigning responsibility seems to be fairly straightforward: post 
 15. Orend, supra note 1 at 49.
 16. Walzer, supra note 9 at 43, 44.
 17. Pattison, supra note 11 at 638-41. 
 18. The potential lack of political will and material capacity of just victors is also mentioned by 
Alex Bellamy. See Bellamy, supra note 2 at 623; George Clifford similarly argues: “Nations 
that win a war may not have the resources, political will, or acceptability required to build 
a just peace unilaterally.” George Clifford, “Jus post bellum: Foundational principles and a 
proposed model” (2012) 11:1 Journal of Military Ethics 42 at 44; Gheciu and Welsh further 
explain why belligerents might not be the most appropriate actors: they generally have high 
stakes; can be biased; and might not be in the best position to act. See Gheciu & Welsh, supra 
note 11 at 134, 136.
 19. Particularly with regard to just interventions. Seth Lazar, “Scepticism about Jus Post Bellum” 
in Larry May & Andrew Forcehimes, eds, Morality, Jus Post Bellum, and International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 204 at 216-17.
 20. Lazar argues that in case of a humanitarian intervention, the duty to reconstruct is universal, 
since the original intervention was a universal duty and everyone should help one in need. Ibid 
at 216.
 21. World Summit Outcome Document 2005, online: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/A-RES-
60-1-E.pdf. 
 22. Carsten Stahn, “The Future of Jus Post Bellum” in Carsten Stahn & Jann Kleffner, eds, Jus Post 
Bellum, Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict to Peace (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 
2008) 231 at 323-24. In the words of Clifford: “In a world increasingly tied by global interests 
and linkages, responsibilities for achieving progress toward peace are international and entail 
situationally determined elements and commitments.” Clifford, supra note 18 at 44. 
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war duties are implied in the just cause of war; whoever ‘breaks’ something for 
a just cause is responsible for repairing what has been broken. But this is not as 
simple as it appears. Whereas the just victor might indeed, so to say, have broken 
something which consequently needs repairing, it is the unjust belligerent who 
is the prime ‘breaker.’ How should we distribute responsibility between just and 
unjust belligerents?23 And what if either or both of these belligerents are not 
willing or able to effectively reconstruct after war? The second position raises 
questions on the distribution of responsibility as well and even more profoundly. 
If the international community as a whole is indeed responsible, then there need 
to be certain conditions that can distribute specific duties (e.g., to reconstruct) to 
specific actors. This means that we need a comprehensive theory on responsibil-
ity for jus post bellum. 
 Alexandra Gheciu and Jennifer Welsh encountered this theoretical lacuna.24 
They mapped and analyzed the various ethical imperatives that are put forward 
in the public debate by international actors that set out to rebuild war torn states. 
It appears that these imperatives entail problematic dilemmas, and that the under-
lying principles have the potential to clash in particular situations. For example, 
regional states could have special obligations due to their proximity, but they 
might not be in the best position to act due to the nature of existing relationships. 
These authors do not resolve these dilemmas, since that “would require argu-
ments that present a compelling case for privileging one guiding principle over 
others (…).”25 James Pattison builds on this and attempts to theorize responsibil-
ity for jus post bellum in such a way that it is possible to privilege one specific 
guiding principle. He claims that jus post bellum is characterized by collective, 
international obligations, which should be assigned according to the ability to 
fulfill these obligations.26 Because belligerents are often not the most capable 
actors, he even argues that there should be a “presumption against belligerents 
rebuilding.”27 While these two analyses are important steps in closing the theo-
retic lacuna regarding post war responsibility, Ghecku and Welsh leave the way 
open for further development, and Pattison’s thought provoking argumentation 
leads to an unsatisfying conclusion, in which capacity and efficiency essentially 
determine who bears the duty to reconstruct.28 
 23. Larry May argues that the burdens of jus post bellum should be shared between belligerents. 
They have to work together to reestablish the rule of law and secure that just and lasting peace. 
The condition of proportionality is helpful in distributing responsibility between former bel-
ligerents. Larry May, After War Ends: A Philosophical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012).
 24. Gheciu & Welsh, supra note 11 at 121-23. 
 25. Ibid at 143.
 26. Pattison, supra note 11 at 635.
 27. Ibid at 658.
 28. Pattison raises justified concerns against the ‘belligerents rebuild thesis’. However, his main 
argument against this thesis is its supposed relation to the ‘dependence approach’, according 
to which the justness of the war is dependent on jus post bellum. And as Pattison rightly rejects 
the latter approach, he rejects the ‘belligerents rebuild thesis’ as well. I am not convinced by 
this line of argument, particularly because of that supposed relation. Aside from Gary Bass, 
most theorists defending the ‘belligerents rebuild thesis’ do not rely on the ‘dependence ap-
proach’ but use other arguments. His argumentation therefore not invalidates the claim that 
former belligerents are the prime duty bearers after war. 
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 Therefore, while the debate on the content and scope of jus post bellum is 
far from settled, I want to focus on the issue of responsibility, which deserves 
more attention than it has received so far. Jus post bellum can only be consid-
ered a fully fledged third branch of just war theory if it is clear who bears the 
responsibility for it, i.e., if it is clear who is addressed by the duties under jus 
post bellum. This means that at least two main questions need answering. First: 
Which conditions can serve as the foundation for post war duties? Second: How 
to weigh these conditions when they clash or when they point to different actors? 
This article directly addresses the foundation for responsibility after war with an 
eye to developing a system for assigning post war duties in concrete situations. 
Here I will focus mostly on the duty of post war reconstruction, as arguably the 
most comprehensive task after war and widely acknowledged as essential for 
contemporary jus post bellum.29 
 I take it that David Miller’s theory on responsibility (section 2) is a prop-
er venue to address the questions mentioned, since the question on how to as-
sign the duty to reconstruct is essentially a question about collective remedial 
responsibly, the issue that is central in Miller’s approach. I will subsequently 
analyze (section 3) the conditions that Miller distinguishes for assigning reme-
dial responsibility and apply them to post war situations. This will bring out the 
strengths and weaknesses of these conditions as foundation for jus post bellum 
duties. I will also explore a condition that is not prominent in Miller’s taxonomy, 
and which can be approached through Hart’s concept of role responsibility (sec-
tion 4). Obviously, it is most important to take stock of the value of the various 
conditions, and to try and determine how they should be applied in real life. The 
goal is to contribute to developing a system for assigning the duty to reconstruct 
to specific actors that can claim general agreement. This requires that a hierarchy 
is set up which enables us to balance these conditions in particular post war situ-
ations (section 5). Only with such a system in place is there a realistic prospect 
that jus post bellum functions as a useful tool in the creation of (somewhat re-
sembling) a just and stable peace. 
Miller’s Collective Remedial Responsibility 
The duty to reconstruct after war is a matter of collective remedial responsibility: 
it is argued that a certain actor, e.g., the victorious state, is collectively responsible 
for remedying post war deprivation. But while just war theorists usually assume 
that states can bear duties, collective responsibility is not undisputed. The problem 
of collective responsibility not only arises with regard to postwar situations; this 
issue has been raised with regard to problems of global justice, and a promising 
solution in this regard is provided by David Miller.30 In general, Miller defends 
 29. I am aware that there are major differences among theorist about what is part of reconstruction 
and what the appropriate scope of reconstruction must be. In this article however, I want to 
leave this matter aside and delve into the issue of responsibility instead. 
 30. David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007) at 81. Miller’s study on national responsibility is well constructed and complex, and 
unfortunately I can only discuss parts of his argument in this article.
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the idea of national responsibility in the sense that individuals have special duties 
towards fellow nationals, but that they have also duties of global justice beyond 
those resulting from violations of the rights of others. Put simply, Miller eloquently 
defends a position in the global justice debate similar to that of John Rawls, in 
which special duties to one’s community are asserted but in which at the same time 
duties of justice towards the global community are defended. It is an alternative to 
both cosmopolitan egalitarianism such as defended by Simon Caney which denies 
the relevance of national borders,31 and nationalism such as defended by Thomas 
Nagel, who distinguishes duties of justice for fellow citizens and much weaker 
global duties of charity or humanity.32 Despite contemporary developments in our 
globalized world, Miller argues there remain significant differences between the 
national and international context. Therefore, national principles of social justice 
cannot extend to global relations: the nation state remains the privileged context 
for social justice.33 But this does not mean that no strong duties exist beyond the 
boundaries of the nation state. These are duties of justice and not merely duties of 
charity or humanity, and they go beyond those resulting from the violation of the 
rights of others. These duties of global justice are generated by basic human rights. 
It means that for Miller, human deprivation and suffering is something that cannot 
be tolerated; it requires collective efforts and thus collective responsibility.
 David Miller’s theory on responsibility, developed in the context of the global 
justice debate, can help us theorize the issue of responsibility in other situations: 
i.e., after war. His concept of remedial responsibility as opposed to outcome 
responsibility, and the concept of collective responsibility as opposed to indi-
vidual responsibility are particularly useful. Miller explains the first distinction 
by using an example in which a teacher returns to an overturned classroom.34 
The teacher might want to know who is responsible for producing the mess, but 
also who is responsible for clearing up that mess. The first question refers to 
the agent producing the outcome (outcome responsibility), the other question to 
the agent who has the duty to put the bad situation right (remedial responsibil-
ity). Both these concepts can be applied in individual contexts such as Miller’s 
example of the classroom, but also in collective contexts: the second important 
distinction Miller makes is between individual and collective responsibility. In 
so far as the concepts of outcome and remedial responsibility are applicable to 
collectives, they can be used for our understanding of just war theory, which 
deals primarily with collective responsibilities.35 There are good reasons to take 
 31. Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
 32. Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice” (2005) 33:2 Philosophy and Public Affairs 
113. For an extensive discussion of the difference between duties of justice and duties of 
charity see: Allen Buchanan, “Justice and Charity” (1987) 97:3 Ethics 558; Miller positions 
himself in the global justice debate as ‘social liberalist’, following the terminology of Charles 
Beitz. This position is contrasted with cosmopolitan liberalism on the one hand and laissez-
faire liberalism on the other. Miller, supra note 30 at 20-21.
 33. Miller, supra note 30 at 15-16.
 34. Ibid at 83-84.
 35. At least in the ad bellum phase just war theory deals with collective responsibilities, but even 
violations of the in bello rules might point at collective responsibilities, when, e.g., the army 
does not provide sufficient training for its soldiers in Geneva rules or, worse, actively encour-
ages brutalities. 
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Miller’s perspective when considering the issue of responsibility for jus post bel-
lum. Below, I will briefly discuss these reasons and the two preliminary issues: 
Miller’s conceptions of outcome and remedial responsibility and that of collec-
tive responsibility. 
 For Miller, the conceptual difference between outcome responsibility and re-
medial responsibility is essential. The first type, outcome responsibility, refers to 
the person that produced the outcome, e.g., who made the mess in the classroom. 
It is the responsibility that a person bears for his own decisions and actions.36 
This type of responsibility is backward looking and answers the question who 
is responsible for a certain problem. Outcome responsibility has a strong causal 
component but cannot be identified with causality: causal responsibility ques-
tions why something has happened, whereas outcome responsibility properly 
questions “whether a particular agent can be credited or debited with a particu-
lar outcome—a gain or a loss, either to the agent herself or to other parties”.37 
Usually, when an individual is responsible for a certain outcome, we feel that 
the gains and losses that fall upon that actor should stay where they are, whereas 
gains and losses that fall upon others should be shifted, e.g., compensated. In 
general, there is a presumption that agents are permitted to enjoy the benefits of 
their actions, as well as bear the burdens of those actions.38 
 The second type is remedial responsibility, which refers to the person that has 
the duty to remedy a certain problem. It is thus forward looking and questions at 
whom fixing the problem can be attributed, i.e., who is in that sense responsible. 
The focus is on the problem that needs remedy. As such, remedial responsibil-
ity is the responsibly that a person may have to help those who are in need of 
our help, although the person who is supposed to help did not necessarily bring 
about the need. Solving the problem is often connected to outcome responsibil-
ity since outcome responsibility is in many circumstances the most obvious basis 
for remedial responsibility. This means that the person who was responsible for 
the outcome, is also remedially responsible. However, actors can be remedially 
responsible even when they are not outcome responsible for the deprivation, and 
then their responsibility is based on other conditions. Miller argues that when 
global problems occur, initially, “there is a moral requirement that falls on ev-
erybody else to provide the help or the resources that are needed.”39 But how do 
we distribute such a duty? It is important to single out some particular actor (or 
actors) who is obligated to put the bad situation right.40 This is what it means to 
be remedially responsible: there is a special responsibility to remedy a problem 
that is not equally shared with all agents, and this agent is liable to sanction if the 
responsibility is not properly discharged.41 Thus, this meaning of responsibility is 
 36. Miller, supra note 30 at 81. 
 37. Ibid at 87.
 38. Ibid at 87.
 39. Ibid at 98.
 40. David Miller, “Distributing Responsibilities” (2001) 9:4 Journal of Political Philosophy 453 
at 469.
 41. This sanction is not necessarily punishment but can entail blame as well. Miller, supra note 30 
at 98-99.
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concerned with remedying a problematic situation, and therefore it is important 
to single out the actor (or actors) that has a special responsibility to end this prob-
lematic situation, e.g., of deprivation. To do that, Miller proposes a taxonomy of 
six different conditions which are relevant when distributing remedial responsi-
bility. As this type of responsibility is precisely what we need for jus post bellum, 
Miller’s taxonomy might serve as a base for the development of a system for 
assigning the specific duty to reconstruct after war. 
 Next to the distinction between outcome and remedial responsibility, Miller 
distinguishes between individual and collective responsibility. Whereas indi-
vidual responsibility might not pose too many problems, collective responsi-
bility is more contested.42 Miller defends the idea of collective responsibility; 
he holds that different collectives might be responsible, but he focuses on the 
nation state who he considers either collectively outcome and/or collectively re-
medially responsible.43 This nationalist position would help us enormously with 
understanding just war theory in general, and jus post bellum in particular. Most 
just war theorists presume such a collective perspective when they consider 
states, nations, or armies as the addressees of just war theory, who consequently 
bear the related duties.44 International organizations also play a role in just war 
thinking, particularly the United Nations. However, it must be noted that the 
United Nations do not act as a genuine collective body but rather via the me-
dium of its member states. Adopting the perspective of collective responsibility 
as conceived by Miller is useful in developing an account of jus post bellum 
which might work in practice. The international arena consists indeed of sov-
ereign (nation) states that decide upon matters such as war, peace building and 
development aid. As such, this perspective is ‘reality based’ and might improve 
the existing global realm by attributing responsibility to these collective actors. 
When we want to consider post war duties in a world without a world state, 
 42. There is an extensive and extremely interesting debate on collective responsibility. However, 
in this article I want to shed light on responsibility for jus post bellum, rather than fully defend 
the issue of collective responsibility as such. This is not to deny that there are other posi-
tions that are eloquently defended, focusing on individuals and individual responsibly, also 
for the issue of war (e.g., Cécile Fabre, Cosmopolitan War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012). For Miller’s defense of national responsibility based on the ‘like-minded group model’ 
and the ‘cooperative practice model’ see Miller, supra note 30 at 111-34, for critique, e.g., 
Roland Pierik, “Collective responsibility and national responsibility” in Helder de Schutter & 
Ronald Tinnevelt, eds, Nationalism and Global Justice. David Miller and his critics (London: 
Routledge, 2011) 94, and for a defense against criticism David Miller, “Collective responsi-
bility and global justice” (2012) 19:4 Ethical Perspectives 627 at 631-35. For the purpose of 
this article, I assume that there is something like collective responsibility, or that it is at least a 
useful fiction, and that as such, nations and states can be responsible actors. 
 43. According to Thom Brooks, we can widen Miller’s focus and extend remedial responsibili-
ties to other groups with a shared identity such as religious groups. Thom Brooks, “Remedial 
responsibilities beyond nations” (2014) 10:2 Journal of Global Ethics 156 at 156, 166. 
 44. One might think in this context of the recent revisionist turn in just war theory, initiated by theo-
rists such as Jeff McMahan, which is based on an individualist account of the theory as opposed 
to the traditional statist account. This challenges mainly the traditional account of jus in bello, as 
it argues that combatants are not morally equal, but that their individual moral standing depends 
on the justness of ‘their’ war. Space precludes me from elaborating further on this topic. See, 
e.g., Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); David Rodin, War 
and Self-Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Helen Frowe, The Ethics of War and 
Peace: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2011) at 29-49, 118-39.
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and without the United Nations which can robustly impose responsibilities and 
enforce compliance, (nation) states remain the prime international actors. Given 
our present purpose, namely to develop an account of responsibility for jus post 
bellum, I assume that there is something like collective responsibility. 
 This is not to say, however, that no difficulties exist as it comes to assign-
ing collective responsibility in concrete cases, which is readily acknowledged 
by Miller. Accepting collective responsibility in the abstract is one thing and 
distributing it in the concrete an entirely other thing. Miller foresees problems 
when attributing collective responsibility to individuals for the policy and ac-
tions of a specific nation state, because of their role in the decision making 
process. Therefore, collective responsibility can be attributed to individuals 
who represent that collectivity, to varying extents. In other words, collective 
responsibility is a matter of degree, depending on what Miller calls the ‘con-
trol dimension’ and the ‘constraint dimension’. The first dimension looks at the 
degree of control individuals have over the policy of their collective, i.e., the 
nation. Obviously, the claim that all citizens share in national responsibility is 
difficult to uphold when the state is as authoritarian in nature as North Korea, 
where the population has hardly any influence over state policy. Here responsi-
bility resides only with the ruling elite. In democratic states and in authoritarian 
states which enjoy popular support, its members do share in the collective na-
tional responsibility. The more democratic the state is, the more it makes sense 
to identify acts by the state as genuine national acts, and to spread responsibility 
among the population.45 The second dimension, the constraint dimension, takes 
into account the external environment of the nation. Is the nation able to execute 
the policy of their choice and to what extent is it constrained by its external 
environment, e.g., by a lack of natural resources or by being small and thus 
not very influential? With regards to problems of global justice, Miller follows 
Rawls in arguing that external and physical factors—constrains so to speak—
do influence the economic wellbeing of the nation, but domestic factors—the 
economic and political system and the national cultural values—have by far the 
most significant impact. Therefore, the constraint factor never fully takes away 
collective (here national) responsibility although national responsibly is always 
a matter of degree. As such, national responsibility is the norm rather than the 
exception, and individuals share in this national responsibility by virtue of their 
membership of nations.46 
 A special difficulty with collective responsibility, which is particularly rel-
evant for jus post bellum, arises with the distinction between states and nations. 
Miller seems to refer deliberately to the nation state as main collective actor, 
but that obscures the obvious problem that not all international actors are nation 
states. The terms state and country refer to legal and political entities that are 
sovereign, internationally recognized, and self governing over a certain territory 
 45. Margaret Moore, “Global justice, climate change and Miller’s theory of responsibility” in 
Schutter & Tinnevelt, supra note 42 at 133.
 46. David Miller, “National Responsibility and Global Justice” (2008) 11:4 Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy 383 at 386-87. 
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(noting that the geographic location is emphasized with the term ‘country’).47 A 
nation on the other hand refers to a large group of people that share a culture, 
language, religion and/or history. When a state encompasses such a unity, it is 
referred to as a nation state. But, as is well known, there is a plurality of cases 
in which state and nation do not coincide: there are stateless nations (e.g., the 
Kurdish nation) and multinational states (e.g., the former Yugoslavia, Canada, 
Iraq). Miller defines a nation state in a similar matter: “The people who belong to 
it are subject to a common set of coercively imposed laws; they are engaged in a 
co-operative practice regulated by a common set of economic and social institu-
tions; and they share a common national identity.”48 In short, its characteristics 
are sovereignty, economic co-operation and national identity. This enables Miller 
to focus on nation states as bearers of collective responsibility, but it seems more 
fair, especially for jus post bellum purposes, to keep in mind both entities.49 The 
state as institution is usually the actor that formally decides on international mat-
ters. As such, it will be mainly (nation) states that are outcome responsible for 
war and post war deprivation.50 States can also formally accept outcome respon-
sibility for a particular situation.51 However, nations can be held responsible in 
this respect as well; Miller agrees when stateless nations “carry out a form of 
ethnic cleansing precisely in order to constitute a territorial state of their own”.52 
One might also think of Islamic State, perhaps best viewed as stateless nation 
despite its self-chosen name, as being responsible. Considering remedial respon-
sibility, it is relatively easy to assign remedial responsibility to states in terms 
of identification, and indeed states are the prime actors to discharge remedial 
responsibilities. However, this might well mean that we assign responsibility 
vicariously, according to Miller. Think of the responsibility of the German Nazi 
state as distinct from the responsibility of the German people.53 Miller admits 
that this matter remains somewhat opaque: “it may not be clear which of the two 
relationships—citizenship or nationality—is doing the work when arguments 
about the importance of the nation state are being advanced.”54 
 47. The definition of statehood in international law is described as follows: “The state as a 
person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a permanent pop-
ulation; a defined territory; government; and capacity to enter into relations with the oth-
er states.” Article 1 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933 (Montevideo 
Convention, entered into force 26 December 1933), online: http://www.cfr.org/sovereignty/
montevideo-convention-rights-duties-states/p15897. 
 48. Miller, supra note 46 at 390.
 49. This has to do with Miller’s foundation for collective responsibility, which are both the ‘like-
minded group model’ and the ‘cooperative practice model’. Together, they can serve as foun-
dation for the responsibility of nations and nation states, however, the foundation of mere state 
responsibility would rely solely on the ‘cooperative practice model’ which Miller considers 
fragile. David Miller, “David Owen on global justice, national responsibility and transnational 
power: a reply” (2011) 37:4 Review of International Studies 2029 at 2030. 
 50. This might be somewhat different for the problem of global poverty. Miller argues that nations 
are often outcome responsible for global poverty, since “it is not states, but peoples, who defor-
est land or deplete fish stocks, for example.” Miller, supra note 42 at 643.
 51. Ibid at 643.
 52. Miller, supra note 49 at 2030.
 53. Miller, supra note 42 at 644.
 54. Miller, supra note 49 at 2029. Similarly, when Miller considers the difference between compa-
triots and citizens in the nation-state, he states that while “there is much to be said for making 
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 Miller’s analysis is highly relevant for the topic of post war justice, both be-
cause of his distinction between outcome and remedial responsibility and for 
his emphasis on collective (national) responsibility for global problems, arguing 
that even when actors were not involved in bringing about a problem, they might 
nonetheless be responsible for solving it. This is extremely helpful: it became 
clear that jus post bellum faces a serious problem, not only because formerly 
warring parties might not be the best placed to discharge post war duties, but 
also because of the uncertainty regarding the distribution of responsibility among 
other actors. To simply state that the just victor must rebuild while it clearly lacks 
the mental or the material capacity, or to state that the responsibility for jus post 
bellum falls indeterminately on ‘the international community,’ does not bring us 
further; “(…) an undistributed duty such as this to which everybody is subject 
is likely to be discharged by nobody.”55 Remedying the post war damage, the 
war’s destruction and deprivation and the building up of a just and durable peace 
should be the main concern after war. Analogue to Miller’s example of the teach-
er returning to an overturned classroom, that consequently needs to be cleared 
up, the war torn state needs to be ‘cleared up’ as well.56 Since it is urgent to have a 
theory of responsibility for jus post bellum, it is adamant to apply Miller’s theory 
to jus post bellum, and to come up with a system that provides the conditions 
for assigning post bellum remedial responsibility. In the next section, an effort is 
made to analyze Miller’s taxonomy in the context of post war situations.
The Foundation of Post War Duties
To address global problems in general, Miller holds, firstly, the concept of reme-
dial responsibility to be central (because global problems need to be addressed in 
any case) and proposes, secondly, what he calls a connection theory of remedial 
responsibility: the nation that is connected in one or more ways to global prob-
lems, say deprivation, can be held responsible for remedying or improving that 
situation. Given that it is intolerable to leave deprivation and suffering to con-
tinue, it is the aim of the theory to come up with a proper way to assign responsi-
bility to at least one actor. This leads Miller to propose six conditions which can 
constitute the foundation for remedial responsibility: moral responsibility, out-
come responsibility, causal responsibility, benefit, capacity, and community. All 
these conditions are considered equally important and they need to be balanced 
against each other in concrete situations by using moral intuition, according to 
Miller: “We have to rely on our intuitions about the relative importance of dif-
ferent sources of connection.”57 In short: the various links that these conditions 
establish between an actor and a particular situation should be considered in 
nation-states the primary bearers of global responsibilities, even here the fit between the group 
that is collectively responsible and the institution to which responsibility is assigned will be 
imperfect”. Miller, supra note 42 at 648.
 55. Miller, supra note 30 at 98. See also: Miller, supra note 40 at 469.
 56. Miller, supra note 30 at 83-84.
 57. Ibid at 107.
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distributing remedial responsibility. It will become clear that the arguments for 
assigning post war duties to certain duty bearers, put forward by just war theo-
rists, largely correspond with these conditions. It is therefore useful to analyze 
these six conditions and so help our thinking about the distribution of duties after 
war. It will appear, or so I hold, that in this particular context some conditions 
do seem to weigh stronger than others, and that there are specific difficulties in-
volved in using these conditions as a foundation for post bellum responsibilities. 
I will discuss three types of cases to explain how these conditions could work: 
self- or other-defense, humanitarian intervention, and ‘debated wars,’ wars of 
which the justness is contested.
 The first condition Miller discusses is ‘moral responsibility,’ When applied to 
post war situations, this condition is an intuitively strong argument for assigning 
responsibility.58 While it might be difficult in the case of global problems such as 
poverty to appoint a particular agent that is to blame, this seems to be easier in 
the case of war. In general, war is prohibited: modern just war theory holds that 
war is principally immoral, but can be justified in exceptional circumstances, 
and there is a legal prohibition on the use of force by states.59 Therefore, some-
thing has clearly gone wrong if war does occur. This means that usually, there 
will be at least one unjustified aggressor bearing the moral guilt for the war and 
subsequent deprivation. As in individual situations of responsibility, it makes 
sense to hold remedially responsible the actor that was at fault for the war. This 
restores the moral balance between the ‘aggressor’ and the ‘victim’.60 In a case 
of an unjustified attack and legitimate self- or other defense, such as the first Gulf 
War, the aggressor, Iraq, was morally responsible for the war and subsequent 
deprivation in Kuwait. As they were unjustified in their attempt to annex Kuwait, 
they are morally to blame for the damage. Based thereon, Iraq appears a likely 
candidate for being remedially responsible for deprivation in Kuwait.
 How does this first condition work for the deprivation resulting from a hu-
manitarian intervention? The situation which leads to a humanitarian interven-
tion is characterized by internal instead of external aggression. Here, we stumble 
upon the difficulties that were foreseen by Miller when addressing collective 
responsibility. These type of cases involves a humanitarian catastrophe (or the 
imminent threat thereof) due to aggression usually performed by the state, i.e., 
governmental elites in power, against (parts of) the population, such as occurred 
in Cambodia or Libya. Clearly, the Khmer Rouge and the Ghaddafi clan were 
morally responsible for the severe harm inflicted on the population. In these 
cases however, it is difficult to hold the nation or the population collectively re-
sponsible for the deprivation and suffering. We could assess the extent to which 
the population had control over the national policy and its collective action 
(could the Cambodians have prevented the uprising of the Khmer Rouge in some 
way?), but in both situations, it would give rise to a minimal degree of collective 
 58. Ibid at 100.
 59. Article 2.4 United Nations Charter 1945 (entered into force 24 October 1945), online: http://
www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/. 
 60. Miller, supra note 30 at 100.
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responsibility at best. Therefore, it is rather difficult to use the condition of moral 
responsibility to pin down remedial responsibility after humanitarian interven-
tions: while the state was (presumably) morally responsible, the morally respon-
sible elites will—after the intervention—no longer make up that state; and the 
population of, say, Cambodia bears no (or minimal) collective national responsi-
bility for the deprivation. 
 The third type of case shows another difficulty with using moral responsibility 
as foundation for remedial responsibility: can we always determine who bears 
moral guilt? While it might on some occasions be clear who was to blame for the 
war—i.e., who violated jus ad bellum—that is often not the case. In many cases, 
the justness of wars is debated and it takes years to determine who was justified 
ad bellum and who was the aggressor, if ever. We need only to bear in mind the 
disagreement on the justness of the Iraq or Afghanistan war to illustrate this 
point. Clearly, Al Qaida was responsible for the terrorist attack on the USA, and 
there was a connection between Al Qaida and the Afghan Taliban regime. But 
was that enough to justify war? Obviously, it is not quite easy to determine who 
is morally responsible for the war and destruction in Afghanistan and thus to as-
sign remedial responsibility using that condition. Nevertheless, also for debated 
wars, moral responsibility is presented as strong argument for assigning post 
war duties to belligerents.61 As such, its intuitive appeal is why opponents of the 
2003 Iraq war are of the opinion that the USA and its coalition partners, having 
unjustly invaded Iraq, are responsible for reconstructing that state.
 The second backward looking condition is ‘outcome responsibility.’ Obviously 
the actor that is morally responsible for a particular outcome is also outcome re-
sponsible. However, other actors can also be outcome responsible even though 
they are not at the same time morally responsible.62 This condition enables us to 
brings many other actors into the picture, which is especially useful with regard 
to post bellum situations. Namely, not only the unjust aggressor but both (or all) 
of the belligerents are outcome responsible for the damage to a certain extent. 
Considering the first Gulf War, Iraq was morally and outcome responsible for the 
post war deprivation in Kuwait, but the USA and its coalition partners were out-
come responsible as well. While they were justified in defending Kuwait against 
Iraqi aggression, damage was caused while doing that. Therefore, Kuwait’s de-
privation is partly a side effect of the USA’s otherwise justified intervention, 
making it outcome responsible to some degree. This way, responsibility can be 
assigned to the ‘other defender’ (here also the just victor) as many theorists do. 
The war was justified but still, it remains the lesser of two evils, i.e.: it is an evil 
for which the actor is responsible.63 We could even assess whether Kuwait is 
partly outcome responsible itself as well. Kuwait’s actions prior to august 1990, 
such as not respecting the oil quota, were an important reason for Iraq to attack 
 61. Pattison rightly points out that: “non-belligerents may have also been culpable for the war, 
such as those that finance the war and provide military equipment.” Pattison, supra note 11 
at 639.
 62. Miller, supra note 30 at 89.
 63. See also Evans, supra note 4 at 153. 
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Kuwait. Iraq made no secret of its plans for the military attack. Kuwait could 
have foreseen this outcome and by not adjusting its policy, it could be argued 
that although it is not morally responsible for the war, it is nevertheless (partly) 
outcome responsible since it contributed to that particular course of events. This 
way, the ‘just defender’ itself, which is also the ‘victim’ can be held responsible. 
 This condition of outcome responsibility works similarly for humanitarian 
interventions: while Vietnam was arguably justified in intervening in Cambodia 
to stop Khmer Rouges’ massacre, forcing them back to jungle rebellion, it attrib-
uted to the damage nonetheless. While the Cambodian state, by way of Khmer 
Rouges’ representatives, was both morally and outcome responsible for many 
deaths, damage, destruction and deprivation, Vietnam is outcome responsible as 
well because it intervened. As such, this condition can serve as a foundation for 
assigning remedial responsibility to the humanitarian intervener. 
 As we have seen, outcome responsibility (which is broader than moral re-
sponsibility) and remedial responsibility are often connected when the former is 
the basis for the latter. In the context of war, this condition can also be used as a 
foundation to hold belligerents responsible for reconstruction after war, based on 
their contribution to that particular outcome, whether their actions were justified 
or not. This is what it means to be responsible based on the adage ‘you break 
it, you own it’. Being in the Pottery Barn, the one who caused the damage and 
created the problem is responsible for putting it right, even if the person breaks 
something by accident.64 Therefore, outcome responsibility is particularly useful 
for debated wars such as Iraq and Afghanistan, because it does not presuppose 
moral guilt for the war. Rather, the actor’s share in producing the outcome—the 
post war situation—is used to attribute responsibility. 
 This, of course, does not decide to what degree belligerents are responsible. 
It would appear that states who are morally responsible for the war are often 
largely responsible for the outcome as well, whereas other belligerents who 
are merely outcome responsible, are so to a lesser extent. We could question 
whether, since they were ad bellum justified, their share in causing the particular 
outcome is large enough to serve as foundation for assigning remedial responsi-
bility. It seems odd to hold the ‘just defender’ responsible for the damage done 
in defending itself, since it was both justified in doing so, and it had no choice.65 
The ‘other defender’ and ‘humanitarian intervener’ were justified also, but made 
a deliberate choice to intervene, knowing that it would cause damage despite its 
expected positive effects. It was, so to say, a ‘war of choice’. Nevertheless, such 
war of choice is one that is aimed at helping others (so we assume), which is why 
 64. A metaphor often accredited to Secretary of State Colin Powell, who supposedly warned 
President George Bush that he would ‘own’ all Iraq’s problems after the invasion. See, e.g., 
Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004). In reality, the retail 
chain of home furnishing stores Pottery Barn does not have such a rule. Additionally, it should 
be noted that contrary to Pattison’s reference to this motto, it seems not to refer to moral guilt 
for damage as basis for the obligation to put it right (Colin Powell did not think at that point 
that the US would be the unjust aggressor), but rather to outcome responsibility for certain 
damage. Pattison, supra note 11 at 637-39.
 65. Assuming here that letting an aggressor annex the victim’s state is not a viable option. 
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some argue that, since they already helped others by intervening, to require them 
to reconstruct after war is overly demanding or even unfair.66 
 Next to these two backward looking conditions for assigning post war respon-
sibility, causality is the third and final backward looking foundation. ‘Causality’ 
constitutes an important element of the previous two conditions, but it is intro-
duced as an independent condition by Miller.67 While outcome responsibility is 
in many respects broader than moral responsibility, pure causality is even broad-
er.68 As such, it is possible that causal responsibility brings more actors into the 
picture than solely those who are morally and/or outcome responsible. However, 
this condition can function independently as foundation for remedial responsibil-
ity only in exceptional circumstances. Miller describes the example of someone 
who acts under coercion: “B says he will kill P, unless A first punches her in the 
face.”69 Also, one can think of rare occasions when the causal link between an 
action and a result is so unpredictable that it would be unreasonable to hold that 
actor outcome responsible.70 Suppose that Iraq did not openly threaten to attack 
Kuwait, and suppose the attack was a totally unforeseen reaction to the afore-
mentioned Kuwaiti policy. Kuwait was not morally or outcome responsible, but 
could be perceived as partly causally responsible for the damage done in the war. 
Also, it is possible to imagine a situation in which a just intervener prevents a 
genocide in state A, while this unexpectedly causes a civil war to erupt in state B. 
Nevertheless, while this might be possible in theory, causality does not constitute 
a serious independent condition for the duty to reconstruct. 
 Taken together, these three backward looking conditions for attributing post 
war duties are based on what Ghecku and Welsh call a ‘compensation rationale,’ 
i.e., the strong moral intuition that one has to compensate for the consequences 
of one’s actions and to ensure the well-being of those affected by them.71 As 
backward looking conditions—and consequently focused on the former bellig-
erents—difficulties are nonetheless encountered when using these conditions as 
foundation for post war responsibility. Here one has to mention, first, the prob-
lem of assigning national responsibility insofar as it is collectively owed by the 
state and the individual members of the population. Some states are so organized 
that it is unfair to hold the population collectively responsible. Second, serious 
epistemic problems exist with regard to the indeterminacy of moral guilt. While 
initially, it seemed relatively easy to determine the actor that is morally blame-
worthy, the reality shows many debated wars: war is often not a situation of the 
 66. Lazar, supra note 19 at 20. Mark Evans, “At War’s End. Time to Turn to Jus Post Bellum?” 
in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday & Jens Iverson, eds, Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the 
Normative Foundations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 26 at 36; Pattison, supra 
note 11 at 638.
 67. Although Miller rightly acknowledges that it can be difficult to separate pure causal responsi-
bility from relationships of outcome and/or moral responsibility. Miller, supra note 30 at 102.
 68. This progressive scale is an oversimplification, think, e.g., of the type of moral responsibility 
that results from an omission to act, which I will elaborate upon in the next section. Miller, 
supra note 40 at 456. 
 69. Miller, supra note 30 at 101.
 70. Ibid at 101.
 71. Gheciu & Welsh, supra note 11 at 124.
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‘good guys’ against the ‘bad guys.’ Both sides usually claim to be justified ad 
bellum. But who is?72 It is well possible that insufficient information is available 
to make such judgment, both before, in and after the war—and it is possible 
that both (or all) actors have some justness on their side.73 Therefore in practice, 
moral guilt is likely to be a matter of degree.74 
 An important third difficulty exists with regard to distributing post war duties 
solely on the basis of backward looking conditions. Gheciu and Welsh rightly 
argue that: “backward looking ideas of causal responsibility relate imperfectly 
to the forward looking task of addressing a problem, since the actor who caused 
another actor to be in danger is not always best placed to rectify the situation.”75 
In other words, it is not at all clear that former belligerents are adequate duty 
bearers in the sense that the problem of post war deprivation gets solved. Former 
belligerents can have high stakes in terms of their own interests and can also be 
seen as biased. Many Kosovars, to mention just one example “remain suspicious 
of the motives and likely effectiveness of EU peace building.”76 Obviously, the 
way the population in a post war situation perceives the actor that is willing to 
reconstruct is important for the effectiveness thereof. This is why Walzer argues 
that the just victor should always seek the consent of the defeated. Furthermore, 
belligerents might not be best placed to remedy post war deprivation because 
they simply lack the capacity to do so. This means that, despite the powerful 
intuitive appeal of these backward looking conditions as foundation for post war 
duties, they are probably not sufficient to solve the problem of distributing re-
sponsibility for jus post bellum. 
 Therefore, it is important to present the other conditions for outcome respon-
sibility. Miller’s fourth condition, ‘benefit’, combines backward and forward 
looking elements. Applied to the issue of war, it points to actors that benefited 
from the war. Belligerents might have benefited from the war, but there might 
also be actors who are not morally, outcome or causally responsible for the war 
or subsequent deprivation, but who have nonetheless benefited from that pro-
cess—the so called ‘innocent beneficiaries’.77 Benefit can thus serve as an ad-
ditional as well as independent condition for assigning remedial responsibility 
as it points to belligerents or outsiders who are the beneficiaries of the action or 
policy that caused harm. In case of the Iraq war, the USA is considered by many 
morally and outcome responsible for the war, and on top of that, it benefited from 
the war in terms of securing their oil interests and in terms of acquiring profitable 
 72. See further on the idea of comparative justice: Steven Lee, Ethics and War: An Introduction 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 104-06.
 73. See, e.g., CAJ Coady, Morality and Political Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008) at 90. 
 74. These two difficulties are equally valid for outcome and causal responsibility; the actors’ share 
in a certain outcome can be difficult to trace back or to determine: it is nearly impossible to 
accurately determine the exact degree of responsibility. See further, e.g., Pattison, supra note 
11 at 638-41.
 75. Gheciu & Welsh, supra note 11 at 134.
 76. Ibid at 135.
 77. Miller mentions, e.g., that it is possible that A played no causal role but nevertheless benefited 
from the process that led to P’s deprivation because “resources that would otherwise have gone 
to P have been allotted to A.” Miller, supra note 30 at 102-03. 
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oil contracts for US corporations. Considering non-belligerents, one could even 
argue that not merely those who have benefitted are responsible, but also those 
who would benefit from the remedy in the longer run. Some just war theorists 
argue that the results of a particular war can bring wider benefits than for those 
directly involved in terms of national and international security.78 For example, 
a stable non-Taliban Afghanistan—not yet realized at this point—which is no 
breeding ground for international terrorism is in everybody’s interest. In this line, 
reconstructing states—preferably as democracies that respect basic rights—as 
a strategy in the fight against terrorism, brings wide benefits so that everyone 
might be considered as responsible for bringing about this result. The recon-
struction of failed states is “something fundamental to the pursuit of regional 
and international security”.79 Obviously, in case of a humanitarian catastrophe, 
the deprived nation is itself the main beneficiary of an intervention,80 but the 
surrounding states also benefit from this reconstruction, e.g., from establishing 
a stable state and halting refugee flows. It could be argued that the international 
community as a whole benefits from reconstruction of a failed state after a hu-
manitarian intervention; left in chaos, a collapsed or failing state destabilizes its 
environment and constitutes a potential breeding ground for international terror-
ism. What remains difficult here as well, is to determine the precise amount of 
benefit: which benefits weigh strong enough for attributing to those beneficiaries 
the duty to reconstruct? 
 Gheciu and Welsh describe such considerations under the heading of ‘benefit’ 
as the ‘defense of society rationale’, based on a broad understanding of national 
interests. They present Kosovo as the example to show that international actors 
taking up their responsibility can build institutions based on democratic values, 
respect for human rights and a market based economy and that therewith inter-
national security is advanced.81 This condition seems to be a weaker founda-
tion for assigning remedial responsibility than the backward looking conditions. 
Furthermore, Gheciu and Welsh point to two disadvantages when applying this 
condition in order to establish remedial responsibility to reconstruct. First, since 
it is difficult to calculate the benefits and their value for any state’s national inter-
est and since this benefit might change over time, there is the danger of inconsis-
tency. The foundation for the duty to reconstruct could cease to exist during the 
course of the reconstruction efforts. Second, if the duty to reconstruct is based 
on the actor’s national interests, it might lead to a lowering of standards.82 For 
example, it is questionable whether making sure that Afghanistan is no breeding 
ground for international terrorism requires the same degree of reconstruction as 
ensuring that the Afghan people can lead a minimally decent life. 
 78. E.g., Michael Walzer, Arguing about War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004) 35 at 43, 44.
 79. Gheciu & Welsh, supra note 11 at 129-31.
 80. Which is why Helen Frowe argues that they should bear the burdens of reconstructing as well. 
“So, if an intervening state inflicts collateral harms in the course of a humanitarian war, we 
might think that the burden of making good those harms falls to those who are the beneficiaries 
of the intervention, and not the intervening state.” Frowe, supra note 44 at 213.
 81. Gheciu & Welsh, supra note 11 at 130.
 82. Ibid at 139-40.
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 The fifth condition for attributing remedial responsibility is fully forward 
looking: the ‘capability’ of a future duty bearer. Who would practically be ca-
pable of remedying the post war deprivation?83 The underlying moral principle is 
well-known and says: who can help should help. A contemporary and often used 
example is Singer’s example of the child that is almost drowning in the pond. 
Whoever is present when this happens, is remedially responsible to save the 
child. Obviously, since the goal is reconstruction of the war-torn state in order 
to remedy the deprivation and achieve a just and lasting peace, capacity to actu-
ally perform that task is essential.84 This is a consequentialist condition which 
focuses both on the desired result and the actor (or actors) that is most likely to 
achieve that aim. Whereas in an individual situation, it is possible that only one 
actor is capable to provide a remedy (e.g., when one person is close enough to 
prevent someone from falling from a steep cliff or when one person is able the 
save the child from drowning), which makes him alone remedially responsible, 
in post war situations there will be many ‘capable’ actors. Therefore, this condi-
tion requires an assessment of the capability of actors of reconstructing after war, 
given the particular circumstances. This probably entails balancing capability, 
effectiveness and costs and as such, it requires an analysis of, e.g., financial costs 
and resources, and knowledge of the local situation and experience in reconstruc-
tion missions. 
 Using capacity as a foundation for assigning remedial responsibility in post-
war situations has strong intuitive plausibility. We do not tend to hold an actor 
remedially responsible when this is unrealistic or overly demanding in terms of 
capability. Suppose Tanzania would have intervened in Rwanda to stop Hutu 
extremists from further executing their plan. However, they would not have the 
financial and material means to effectively reconstruct Rwanda afterwards. It 
seems both imprudent to assign remedial responsibility to Tanzania, because it 
could not effectively remedy the deprivation, but it is also unreasonable since 
they already taken up the task of intervening and additional duties would bring 
too much costs for themselves. 
 This condition is presented by Miller as one among the six conditions for as-
signing remedial responsibility. Nonetheless, it seems that this condition is of a 
different order. We have already encountered several difficulties when applying 
the previous conditions as foundation for remedial responsibility and noted as an 
important problem precisely this requirement of capacity. A state might be linked 
in several ways with post war deprivation, e.g., it is both morally and outcome 
responsible, and may have benefited from the war. But despite these strong links, 
if it does not have any capacity to fulfill such duty, remedial responsibility cannot 
be assigned to that state. In those situations, moral and outcome responsibility do 
 83. Miller, supra note 30 at 130.
 84. According to Pattison, this foundation trumps the other foundations for assigning the duty to 
reconstruct. This consideration is more important than the other factors, because they relate 
to less morally urgent concerns. Namely, the goal is to properly rebuild the war torn state and 
protect the populations basic rights. Pattison, supra note 11 at 656. He therewith disagrees with 
Miller, who claims there is no hierarchy between the discussed variables. 
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not lead to the duty to make it right. In such cases, Miller argues that “since the 
whole purpose of identifying remedial responsibilities is to get help to P, picking 
the agent who is actually able to provide that help makes obvious sense.”85 Thom 
Brooks too argues that “the ability to provide a remedy is central to the possibil-
ity of possessing a remedial responsibility.”86 This means that the condition of 
capability works as a precondition for assigning remedial responsibility, rather 
than as one among the other conditions. Despite Miller’s insistence on there not 
being a hierarchy between the six conditions, he writes that: “we have no alterna-
tive but to consider each of the agents (…) able to provide a remedy and then to 
assess how strongly each is connected to the impoverished group.”87 
 The final condition for assigning post bellum duties is ‘community.’ Some 
states are located within the same region as the war torn state, or states may share 
the same religion or culture with the war torn state. Therefore, they are linked 
in such a way so that remedial responsibility can be assigned to these states. It 
seems convincing that relations based on shared communities give rise to spe-
cial obligations. For example, it would seem right that other states in the region, 
but also Belgium, are more responsible than others to contribute to the building 
up of Rwanda after the Rwandan genocide. Sharing a geographical region or a 
history together generates shared responsibilities, in this case towards post-war 
Rwanda.88 Gheciu and Welsh argue in a similar vein that the shared identity of 
European countries with the Balkans was used as foundation for Europe to have 
a special duty to reconstruct this area.89
Role Responsibility 
Miller’s taxonomy helps us gain insight into the foundation for remedial respon-
sibility after war. However, the reasons just war theorists give for assigning the 
remedial duty to reconstruct to certain actors are not completely explained by the 
above analysis. An important issue is still absent: a special type of moral respon-
sibility which can be approached through Hart’s concept of role responsibility. 
Hart explains role responsibility in the context of his comprehensive account of 
individual responsibility in the national legal system. His famous example of the 
drunken captain who lost his ship at sea with all aboard serves as an illustration 
of the fact that responsibility can refer to “a wide range of different, though con-
nected, ideas.”90 One of these types of responsibility is role responsibility: the 
responsibility that is based on the fulfillment of a specific role, in this case, that 
of a captain who is responsible for the safety of the passengers. By getting drunk 
and not making the required effort, he is violating his role responsibility and thus 
 85. Miller, supra note 30 at 103.
 86. Thom Brooks, “Rethinking remedial responsibilities” (2011) 4:3 Ethics & Global Politics 195 
at 200.
 87. Miller, supra note 30 at 107.
 88. Miller, supra note 40 at 462.
 89. Gheciu & Welsh, supra note 11 at 126.
 90. HLA Hart & John Gardner, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 211.
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.18
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Radboud University Nijmegen, on 04 Feb 2020 at 20:38:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
On the Duty to Reconstruct After War 423
responsible for the loss of the ship and passengers. In short, with a certain role 
come specific duties, e.g., for captains to ensure the safety of the passengers and 
to deliver the cargo, or for parents to bring up their children. Hart has a rather 
broad understanding of role responsibility, as it also involves duties that come 
with temporary tasks, assigned to someone by agreement or otherwise.91 
 Because of the importance of role responsibility for jus post bellum, as dis-
tinct from moral responsibility discussed above, it is necessary to present it as a 
separate seventh condition. The above shows that the most obvious reason for 
moral responsibility in post war situations is the moral guilt for the war itself—
the moral responsibility related to unjustified aggression. However, an actor can 
also be morally responsible based on either an omission to act in accordance with 
a certain formal role, or based on an (usually more informal) ad bellum assumed 
role. As such, role responsibility is a subspecies of moral responsibility. Miller 
states that one can be morally responsible for failing to fulfill a pre-existing ob-
ligation.92 And although Miller does not discuss this type of moral responsibility 
in detail, he mentions an example which resembles the type of responsibility 
that is meant here: a dad takes two kids to the park, where one breaks the other’s 
arm by accident, while he reads a newspaper. Dad is not causally responsible but 
he is morally responsible because he failed in his duty to take care of the kids, 
something that he assumed when he offered to take them to the park.93 He did not 
himself inflict the damage, but this specific role as supervisor comes with duties 
which he is bound to fulfill. 
 This concept of moral role responsibility must serve as an additional condi-
tion for assigning the duty to reconstruct in two ways. First, actors might have 
duties attached to a specific formal role and be role responsible when they fail to 
discharge the attached duties ad bellum or in bello. Consider again the Rwandan 
genocide: clearly, Hutu extremists were morally responsible for the deaths and 
damage in 1994. However, Belgium and other members of the UNAMIR mis-
sion were present at the time. Despite their initial limited mandate, they were 
formally assigned the duty to protect the Rwandan population. As is painfully 
known, they withdrew after the first Belgian soldiers were killed, and manifestly 
failed in their mission because of this omission to act when it was necessary to 
do so. They are role responsible for failing to prevent the genocide,94 while they 
were not responsible in a causal way.95 Similarly, European countries intervened 
in the Balkans and took on the role of protecting the population. Their failing to 
properly discharge that responsibility during the war creates a strong foundation 
for remedial responsibility.96
 91. Ibid at 212-13.
 92. Miller, supra note 30 at 100.
 93. Miller, supra note 40 at 456.
 94. Of course the UN itself was in the end responsible for failing to provide the necessary political 
authorization, manpower and material for effective military action. 
 95. Although if we trace causality further back, we could argue that Belgium was causally respon-
sible since they institutionalized the ethnic division between Hutu’s and Tutsi’s, which played 
a role in the animosity and subsequent aggression between the two groups. 
 96. Gheciu and Welsh argue that: “the European Union’s current responsibility to rebuild in the 
Balkans stems from a dual source: perceived special duties vis-à-vis fellow Europeans, and 
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 Second is the responsibility that lies entailed in jus ad bellum. Actors can be 
morally responsible not only because of their violation of jus ad bellum, or be-
cause of their omission to act in accordance with a certain role, but also based on 
a role that they self-adopted through a public ad bellum ‘promise.’ Suppose that 
a state justifies its ad bellum decision to go to war, and that it makes promises 
about the post war situation as part of its just cause and chance of success. In that 
case it (informally) adopts a certain role which entails specific duties. Examples 
would be the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: they were originally waged as self-
defensive wars but humanitarian considerations were invoked as well in the jus-
tification for those wars. Particularly during the Iraq war, the emphasis shifted 
more and more towards ending the human rights violations and promoting de-
mocracy as main causes for war.97 By such a public statement, the state makes a 
promise with which it takes upon itself a distinct role that creates responsibility. 
It is then obligated to fulfill that role and the duties that are attached to it; in other 
words, it is responsible for achieving the promised goal. Actors can also try to 
avoid such moral role responsibility by refusing to make such a promise. When a 
coalition of states intervened in Libya in 2011, leaders were, contrary to the wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, anxious to stress the limited nature of the intervention. 
Barack Obama stated that the focus of the mission was to protect Libyan civil-
ians, not regime change.98 This strategy of emphasizing the limited casus belli is 
aimed at limiting Western responsibilities after the war. 
 In short: with specific commitments and the assuming of a certain role comes 
moral role responsibility. This last condition further explains our intuitions on 
how to distribute responsibly after war. It clarifies why we tend to hold the just 
victor remedially responsible after humanitarian interventions, or after debated 
pre-emptive wars that are aimed at regime change and protection of the popula-
tion. That is not only because of moral and/or outcome responsibility. Also, these 
states are responsible for post war reconstruction because of the adopted role and 
the promise of achieving certain results, which creates legitimate expectations. 
A System for Assigning Post War Duties 
The goal of this article was twofold: to shed light on the foundation for respon-
sibility after war and to develop a system for assigning the duty to reconstruct 
to specific actors. In the above, various conditions were analyzed and an insight 
into the foundation for responsibility was given. As we have seen, most just war 
the additional responsibility incurred by recent negligence in fulfilling those duties.” Gheciu 
& Welsh, supra note 11 at 126.
 97. George Bush declared “The goal in Iraq and Afghanistan is for there to be democratic and free 
countries who are allies in the war on terror. That’s the goal. (…) we will stay there to get the 
job done.” See George W Bush, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Book 2, 
July 1 to September 30, 2004 at 1715. 
 98. See, e.g., http://news.sky.com/story/844653/obama-libya-mission-is-not-regime-change. A na- 
tional security advisor further explained that “it’s the Libyan people who are going to make 
their determinations about the future.” See http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/151191- 
white-house-suggests-regime-change-is-goal-of-libya-mission. 
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theorists pick one or more of these conditions to assign post war responsibility. 
For example, Orend argues that the victor is mainly responsible because if ‘you 
break it, you own it.’99 Pattison argues for a presumption against belligerents re-
building, and claims that the most capable rebuilder is remedially responsible in-
stead.100 However, it seems overly simplistic to rely on one condition and expect 
that this singles out the appropriate duty bearer in all situations, as these authors 
do. Neither of these conditions is decisive by itself. Given the international real-
ity of today, and the contemporary view on jus post bellum, there is a need for a 
system that combines both backward and forward looking conditions. It seems 
right for a comprehensive system to both do justice to the morally relevant con-
siderations, while at the same time remaining focused on the aim of halting post 
war deprivation. Regarding international problems in general, Miller holds that 
all six conditions are relevant for remedial responsibility and that they must be 
balanced in concrete situations. These conditions are relevant for post war depri-
vation as well, supplemented by the seventh condition that is added to Miller’s 
taxonomy. However, when these conditions are balanced in concrete post-war 
situations, it would nevertheless be helpful if we could say something about their 
relative weight. Therefore, an attempt is made to systemize them. 
 What would a system for distributing the duty to reconstruct look like? For jus 
post bellum, it became clear that these conditions are not of equal weight and it 
seems therefore possible to attain a certain hierarchy between them. The condi-
tion of capability has the special function of precondition for assigning remedial 
responsibility. In order to achieve a just and stable peace—the axiomatic goal of 
jus post bellum101—it is prerequisite that an actor is capable to achieve (part) of 
this goal. The condition of capability preselects which actors are potential duty 
bearers and which are not.102 An actor cannot be held remedially responsible for 
reconstruction if it is not capable of achieving that result, even if this actor is con-
nected in other ways with the deprived war torn state. On that basis many poor 
states are excluded from post bellum duties. How do we determine which par-
ticular states are excluded? In Miller’s perspective on global justice, duties are 
generated by basic human rights, which constitute a certain ‘minimum:’ Some 
 99. Orend, supra note 1 at 49. 
 100. Given that this actor also has the ‘right’ to rebuild, which is so when there is a just cause 
for rebuilding and the effort is likely to be effective. Pattison, supra note 11 at 652. Pattison 
further argues that the UN Security Council should generally carry out the rebuilding process 
after war, an argument of which I am rather skeptical since contemporary reality forces us to 
be modest in our expectations of existing global institutions. While the UN might be generally 
perceived as a legitimate actor in the eyes of the deprived nation, it is questionable whether it is 
indeed the most capable actor to carry out reconstruction. Surely, when the UN and the Peace 
Building Commission would work as envisioned, they are in a good position to at least oversee 
post war duties. Exploring this line of global institutional reform would require however more 
space than is available in this article. Pattison, supra note 11 at 656-59.
 101. E.g., Evans, supra note 4 at 149.
 102. Thom Brooks similarly argues that Miller should correct his connection theory of remedial 
responsibility. He argues that his system is better understood as a ‘two tiered procedure’ ask-
ing different questions: “The first tier would ask which nations possess capacity.” Thereafter, 
we should “select a nation or nations from this pool of nations capable of being remedially 
responsibly according to Miller’s conditions.” Consequently, “There is an algorithm after all.” 
Brooks, supra note 86 at 200-01.
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essential human rights must be fulfilled “if a person is to have a minimally decent 
life in the society to which he or she belongs.”103 It seems that this could function 
as threshold for duties regarding jus post bellum: whenever a state is not capable 
of reconstructing the war torn state without (further) infringing its own citizens’ 
minimally decent lives, they are not required to do so. 
 This precondition will thus exclude certain actors from post war duties, but 
it then obviously also determines the remaining actors as potential duty bearers. 
Should we try to determine who is most capable and then assume that any state 
that has the most resources and knowledge is remedially responsible for post war 
reconstruction? This would seem unlikely. Merely assigning post war duties to 
the most capable state(s) would not work; capacity cannot function as the sole 
foundation for assigning remedial responsibility after war, as Pattison suggests. 
It would mean that the same actors—presumably the richest and most developed 
states—are always remedially responsible for post war reconstruction around 
the world. Capacity is the necessary condition, but not the sufficient or decisive 
condition. For answering the question of which states capable of assuming post-
war duties should be picked out in a particular case, one has to look at the other 
conditions. 
 War is a human activity involving intentional and collectively inflicted de-
struction, and because of this great evil of war, moral and outcome responsibility 
must remain important considerations when assigning the duty to reconstruct. In 
individual situations, we are considered to be responsible for the consequences 
of our actions. This means that when we do damage to others, we are liable 
for that damage. Hart writes: “He is thus liable to be ‘made to pay’ for what 
he has done.”104 There is a presumption that actors bear the burdens of their 
own actions.105 As we have seen, aggressive states are both morally and outcome 
responsible for post war deprivation, but just belligerents nonetheless bear re-
sponsibility for the outcome as well. This means that there is a presumption that 
belligerents are themselves responsible for post war reconstruction. What about 
the relative value of these two conditions? It appears that being merely outcome 
responsible constitutes a weaker foundation for the duty to reconstruct than be-
ing both outcome and morally responsible. Damage and destruction as a result 
of actions that are justified—and which thus results in outcome responsibility 
only—are less blameworthy than damage and destruction as a result of evil or 
unjustified actions—resulting in moral responsibility as well. In the former case, 
the damage might be foreseen, but it is the side-effect of actions that are in them-
selves justified. Furthermore, the strength of outcome responsibility depends on 
whether a war was a ‘matter of choice’ or not: the outcome responsibility of 
an actor that had no choice but to defend itself is weaker than that of the other 
defender or humanitarian intervener that chose to get involved and was able to 
consider the implications of that act, despite their possible good intentions. 
 103. See Miller, supra note 46 at 391.
 104. Hart & Gardner, supra note 90 at 215.
 105. Miller, supra note 30 at 87.
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 But while moral and outcome responsibility could serve as foundation for post 
war duties, the precondition of capability might stand in the way. Considering 
moral responsibility first; while it might be clear who is morally responsible 
after a self-defense against aggression,106 that aggressor might not be capable of 
successfully reconstructing after war, either because of a lack of resources and 
knowledge, or because the hostility between the former belligerents hinders ef-
fective reconstruction. We can imagine, to mention an example, that Kuwaitis 
would not ravish at the prospect of Iraq being assigned the duty to reconstruct 
after the 1990 war.107 After a humanitarian intervention, it might also be difficult 
to use this condition for the distribution of responsibility. Here the aggressor 
was the regime that targeted its own population. That population does not have a 
share in the collective responsibility of the state, for reasons addressed by Miller. 
And the responsible regime itself was presumably removed by the intervention 
and unable to bear the duty to reconstruct. As we have seen, while moral respon-
sibility is an intuitively-strong foundation for post war duties, it will be difficult 
to use it to pin down duty bearers in practice. 
 Turning to outcome responsibility brings other belligerents into the picture, 
and as such, it can be used to assign the duty to reconstruct to the ‘other defender’ 
and the ‘humanitarian intervener’. Presuming that these just belligerents have 
sufficient resources, they are the likely candidates for bearing the duty to recon-
struct because they are partly responsibility for that particular outcome. Against 
the argument that it is unfair or overly demanding to assign reconstruction to 
these actors, one might argue that this (heavy) burden could and should (under 
the ad bellum condition of reasonable chance of success) have been foreseen in 
advance. States are indeed required to carefully consider the weight of this bur-
den before they embark on war or intervention. If they are not willing to fulfill 
their post war duties, the war should not have been undertaken. In this way, it 
is indeed possible that states who perform morally good actions acquire more 
responsibilities than they would have had otherwise, as Walzer argues.108 
 Finally, Hart’s concept of role responsibility is an important condition for as-
signing the remedial duty to reconstruct. This type of responsibility follows either 
from an ad bellum or in bello omission to act in accordance with a certain role, or 
from an ad bellum promise that shapes a special role. Moral role responsibility 
does not exist in all situations of war, for example when a self defense is merely 
aimed at repelling an aggression. Furthermore, the strength of role responsibil-
ity depends on the nature of the promise made: was it made once or repeatedly, 
was it publicly announced and recorded in official documents, addressed at the 
actor’s population, and/or at the population of the war torn state directly? The 
 106. While this is the case in our example of the first Gulf War, it is surely not always easy to 
determine whether a self defense is indeed a legitimate self defense. Consider, e.g., preemptive 
or preventive self defenses: the distinction between a legitimate self defense, a defense before 
its time, and a war of aggression is not always easy to make.
 107. It should be noted that this does not mean that Iraq cannot be held liable for financially 
compensating Kuwait. But this is a question that is separated from the question as to who is 
responsible for halting the deprivation and reconstructing the war torn area. 
 108. Walzer, supra note 9 at 40.
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stronger the commitment, the stronger the role responsibility. Again, role respon-
sibility is particularly strong in case of a humanitarian intervention, where the 
intervener assumes the role of rescuer. Inherent in the just cause of the intervener 
is the adoption of a humanitarian role: the duty to indeed halt the catastrophe 
and to remedy the deprivation. Provided the humanitarian intervener is capa-
ble to help reconstruct after the intervention, which they are whenever they can 
do so without infringing its own citizens’ minimally decent lives, outcome and 
role responsibility constitute a strong foundation for remedial responsibility.109 
However, when a state is willing but not capable of post war reconstruction, it 
seems that it should nevertheless be able to justly intervene to prevent or stop a 
humanitarian catastrophe. Alex Bellamy rightly argues that to claim otherwise 
“dramatically reduces the number of potential agents who might save strangers 
in urgent peril”.110 For that reason, humanitarian emergencies are an exception 
to obligations to build the peace afterwards, according to Bellamy.111 States can 
legitimately intervene despite them not having the means to reconstruct after the 
war. If this should be the case, the intervening state should prevent the creation 
of legitimate expectations by making statements about their limited aims. 
Conclusion
In this article some steps are made towards developing a comprehensive system 
of conditions that can serve as foundation for the duty to reconstruct as part of 
jus post bellum. I have argued in favor of a system that combines both backward 
and forward looking conditions, wherein forward looking capability functions as 
a precondition. Backward looking moral, outcome and role responsibility func-
tion then as the most important conditions, and finally the conditions of benefit 
and community further help in the distribution of the duty to reconstruct after 
war. This system thus presumes that belligerents are responsible for reconstruc-
tion after war. But while the conditions seem to work quite straightforwardly in 
theory, real world scenarios are always complex, making it difficult to pin down 
remedial responsibility to belligerents in practice. Recalling Miller’s claim that 
it is morally unacceptable for people to be left in a deprived situation, “there is a 
moral requirement that falls on everybody else to provide the help or the resourc-
es that are needed.”112 Along with the shift towards a maximalist jus post bellum, 
 109. It seems to me that when a state is willing but not capable of post war reconstruction, it 
can nevertheless justly intervene to prevent or stop a humanitarian catastrophe. Alex Bellamy 
rightly argues that to claim otherwise “dramatically reduces the number of potential agents 
who might save strangers in urgent peril”. Therefore, humanitarian emergencies are an excep-
tion to obligations to build the peace afterwards, according to Bellamy. Bellamy, supra note 
2 at 620-21. If this should be the case, the intervening state should prevent the creation of 
legitimate expectations by making statements about their limited aims, thereby limiting their 
role responsibility. 
 110. Alex Bellamy points to the danger inherent in requiring humanitarian interveners to bear the 
duty to reconstruct after the intervention: not every intervener has the means to fulfill that duty. 
Bellamy, supra note 2 at 620-21.
 111. Ibid at 620-21.
 112. Miller, supra note 30 at 98.
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this means that in concrete situations, the aim of halting post war deprivation 
and building a just and durable peace compels us to widen the scope of respon-
sibility beyond the belligerents. The ‘belligerents rebuilt thesis’ must therefore 
be understood in a more nuanced way than it initially appeared: belligerents are 
not solely responsible.113 If they cannot bear the duty to reconstruct themselves, 
other actors are remedially responsible instead. In that case, the duty to remedy 
post-war deprivation does not shift to an indeterminate ‘everybody else’ or ‘in-
ternational community.’ Rather, the various conditions can be used to assign the 
duty to reconstruct to other specific actors. One can think of a humanitarian in-
tervention in which the aggressive regime is toppled, while the intervener is not 
capable of reconstructing the state and securing a just peace (alone). Other states 
must be assigned the duty to reconstruct based on, e.g., their share in the moral 
guilt (e.g., by indirectly supporting the aggressive regime), their proximity and 
received past or future benefits. Ideally, the United Nations and organizations 
such as the Peace Building Commission have a distinct role in reconstruction 
after war, mainly one of coordination and overview. 
 Unfortunately, there are still reasons to be skeptical about the effectiveness 
of jus post bellum. Whereas just war theories’ principles, both jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello, are codified in international law to some extent, jus post bel-
lum remains essentially a mere moral theory. One can be sympathetic towards 
Orend’s vivid plea for a new Geneva Convention, but the development of inter-
national law takes much time and effort and a new jus post bellum treaty is not 
expected in the near future.114 Furthermore, even if such treaty would be created, 
an authority—a ‘global teacher’—to assign remedial responsibility and enforce 
compliance is absent in the international context. Pattison’s plea for building a 
stronger UN system so that the responsibility to rebuild can be properly realized 
is therefore also welcomed.115 Institutional reform is most urgent. An institution-
al framework for distributing remedial responsibility would be highly valuable 
for jus post bellum. However, neither is expected in the near future. The reality is 
that, despite the fact that jus post bellum is welcomed as part of just war theory, 
international law and global institutions fall behind the moral theory. As a result, 
it remains somewhat noncommittal and duty bearers can ignore their post war 
responsibility. 
 Nevertheless, jus post bellum can fulfill a useful role as moral framework. 
And precisely this current absence of a jus post bellum Geneva Convention and 
a capable global teacher makes it even more important to have a well consid-
ered system (of which this sketch is merely the beginning) to assign remedial 
responsibility that can invoke general agreement. But could there be some sort 
of agreement on who bears the duty to reconstruct and if so, to what extent? As 
was pointed out, when it comes to real wars and post war situations, with all 
 113. In other words: the ‘belligerents rebuild thesis’ is the first right answer, but is it by itself an 
incomplete answer to questions of responsibility for jus post bellum. See further also Pattison, 
supra note 11 at 641.
 114. Orend, supra note 1 at 52.
 115. Pattison, supra note 11 at 659.
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their nuances, complexities and ambiguities, things become complicated. Due to 
epistemological difficulties, it can often be difficult to determine the exact value 
of the various conditions for remedial responsibility. Given these inherent dif-
ficulties, it will not be easy to reach agreement between actors on who bears the 
duty to reconstruct. It is to be expected that the system developed here will not 
produce clear, self-evident results in concrete situations. Rather, these conditions 
can be used to ‘build a moral case’ to form an argument based on which the duty 
to reconstruct is assigned to specific actors. It is unlikely that one might indisput-
ably determine who is responsible after war, but a case for a certain distribution 
of responsibility can be made, based on the hierarchy of conditions that is devel-
oped here. This means that the existence of jus post bellum is not quite secure. 
Yet, having a better grip on responsibility for jus post bellum is certainly helpful, 
and a necessary tool in the creation of a just and stable peace. 
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